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Abstract: Computer simulations are nowadays often directly involved in the gen-
eration of experimental results. Given this dependency of experiments on computer
simulations, that of simulations on models, and that of the models on free param-
eters, how do researchers establish trust in their experimental results? Using high
energy physics (HEP) as a case study, I will identify three different types of robust-
ness that I call conceptual, methodological, and parametric robustness, and show
how they can sanction this trust. However, as I will also show, simulation models
in HEP themselves fail to exhibit a type of robustness I call inverse parametric ro-
bustness. This combination of robustness and failures thereof is best understood by
differentiating different epistemic capacities of simulations and different senses of
trust: Trusting simulations in their capacity to facilitate credible experimental re-
sults can mean accepting them as means for generating belief in these results, while
this need not imply believing the models themselves in their capacity to represent
an underlying reality.
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1 Introduction
Computer simulations (CSs) are nowadays often directly involved in the generation of experi-
mental results. This fact has recently been recognised by philosophers for raising a number of
epistemological challenges: Simulated data are often treated as equivalent to experimental data,
and this requires an analysis as to the appropriateness of such treatments (Morrison, 2015; Mas-
simi and Bhimji, 2015; Parker, 2017). Devising a CS presupposes a whole chain of models that
includes manifold successive modifications, from simplifications and approximations to out-
right artificial constructions (Lenhard, 2007; Winsberg, 1999; Morrison, 2009; Winsberg, 2010;
Boge and Zeitnitz, 2020). This introduces sources of potential error from incorrect modelling to
malfunctioning hard- and software. Finally, (virtually) every CS makes use of parameters that
have to be fixed empirically, and this raises the question of how these parameters influence the
epistemic status of corresponding experimental results and the models used to facilitate them
(Hasse and Lenhard, 2017; Gueguen, 2019; Ritson and Staley, 2020).
Given this dependency of experiments on CSs, the dependency of CSs on modelling as-
sumptions, and the dependency of the models on parameter-choices, I will here investigate the
following question: how do researchers establish trust in their experimental results and what
does this tell us about the models used? I will here focus on robustness analysis (RA), charac-
terised as a “method for determining which models make trustworthy predictions” by Weisberg
(2006, p. 731), as a key to understanding the prospects and limitations of trusting CSs in the
generation of simulation-infected experimental results.
Like Staley (2020), I will use experimental High energy physics (HEP), the study of inter-
actions between material particles in high-energetic collisions, as a case study; for Morrison
(2015, p. 287) displays CSs as a conditio sine qua non therein: They are used to estimate the
discovery potential of detector components before these are built, define the ‘background’ data
to be expected in the absence of phenomena of interest for statistical analyses, or even what sig-
natures of interest might look like. Thus, “simulation plays a significant role in the experimental
setting” (Morrison, 2015, p. 288, orig. emph.).
I will argue for a differentiated view, according to which (HEP) researchers justifiably trust
their experimental results without having to invest outright belief in the simulation models used
to facilitate them. I hence distinguish two senses of trust to be potentially invested in simulation
models: trust in their capacity to facilitate credible experimental results, and trust in their ca-
pacity to faithfully represent an underlying reality. That these can fall apart in principle should
be evident: an experimenter’s skill, say, or a measuring instrument, can be trustworthy in the
former sense without even being suitable for the latter. However, simulation models are gener-
ally intended as (more or less accurate) representations; so it is a non-trivial observation if they
turn out trustworthy in the former but not in the latter sense.
To carefully distinguish between both capacities, I will identify four types of robustness, three
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of which concern experimental results: (i) their insensitivity to varying modelling assumptions
in the definition of simulation programs used in their generation; (ii) to different uses of CS
therein; and (iii) to changes in values of the models’ free parameters.1 The fourth, however,
concerns the parameters themselves, namely: (iv) the insensitivity of their values to varying
experimental conditions in which the models are used.
Below, I will call (i) conceptual robustness (CR), as it concerns the conceptualization of
simulation-targets; (ii) methodological robustness (MR), as it concerns simulation-based meth-
ods for extracting experimental information; (iii) parametric robustness (PR), for obvious rea-
sons; and (iv) inverse parametric robustness (IPR), as it concerns the parameters, not the results
gained with them.
CR, MR, and (some sense of) PR establish a rather solid basis for HEP researchers to trust
their experimental results. In contrast, IPR is doubtful, and this has implications for the mod-
els’ epistemic status. As I shall argue, the relevant simulation models are best understood as
reliable cognitive instruments, not faithful representations of the goings on in the ‘beam pipes’
of colliders.
The structure is as follows: After a recap of some relevant results from the debate on RA
(Sect. 2), the first, ‘analytic’ part (Sect.s 3–5) establishes the four types of robustness and the
sense of justification they convey. The second, ‘critical’ part (Sect. 6) then inquires about
the epistemic status of the models used in relevant inferences. I also offer an outlook, in the
conclusion, on why the results are not only interesting w.r.t. the paper’s main case study but
simulation-heavy fields more generally.
2 Robustness analysis: Taking stock and looking ahead
Following Wimsatt (1981), the ‘robustness’ of an experimental or theoretical result means its
invariance under changing means of detection. Robustness analysis is the process of “explor-
ing the differences in past means of detection that have had no (or a negligible) effect on the
result—and also [...] exploring variations that have made a difference to the result” (Schupbach,
2016, p. 277). RA has been applied to models (e.g. Weisberg, 2006; Weisberg and Reisman,
2008; Lloyd, 2009, 2010; Parker, 2011), experiments (Staley, 2004b, 2020; Schupbach, 2016;
Karaca, 2018), and CSs (Muldoon, 2007; Durán and Formanek, 2018; Gueguen, 2019; Lehtinen
and Kuorikoski, 2007). In HEP, these issues become entangled, and subjecting models and sim-
ulation to RA can in principle serve the goal of inferring something about experimental results
or the status of simulation models.
Famously, there has been considerable debate about what RA across models can establish. In
response to Levins (1966), Orzack and Sober (1993) had objected that Levins’ discussion made
RA look like a method of non-empirical confirmation – something not easily acceptable to
most philosophers. Furthermore, there is a long-standing debate on how to assess the diversity
of different means detection involved in RA, as well as their independence (see Schupbach,
2016, Sect. 2.1–2.4).
These concerns have been forcefully answered by Schupbach (2016): If a certain result is
invariant under changing means of detection, then this successively rules out different explana-
1(i) and (iii) are closely related to what Weisberg (2013, pp. 159 ff.) calls parameter and structural robustness, the
salient difference being that I am here interested in simulation-infected experimental results, not model behaviour
alone.
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tions of that result in terms of properties peculiar to any given detection. Competing explana-
tions of the result’s occurrence thus need not be fully independent, so long as accepting one rules
out the other as an explanation.2 Furthermore, models and empirical procedures can in principle
be treated on a par as means of detection, whence the consistency between measurement results
and model predictions can contribute to the confirmation of a result by safeguarding against re-
liance on either modelling- or measurement-errors (Winsberg, 2018a,b). However, this (strong)
sense of confirmation is obviously not non-empirical.
Most experimental result are quantitative, and two means of detection never yield the exact
same values. Hence, I prefer talk of ‘insensitivity’ rather than invariance, meaning that individ-
ual results, subjectable to RA, do not so strongly depend on the individual means for detection
that they become statistically inconsistent with one another.3 Salient experimental results in
HEP are evidence for, or observations of, new particles, measurements of, e.g., anomalous
production-rates for certain final-state particles, or bounds established on certain quantities of
interest. ‘Evidence’ and ‘observation’ are technical terms in this context, meaning a discovery-
significance above 2.8 or 5 standard deviations, respectively (Franklin, 2013). Since obser-
vations and evidence thus rely on measured excesses of events in specific regions of certain
kinematic variables, I will treat all these as measurements. Furthermore, ‘measurements’ are
rarely ever direct comparisons between physical quantities, but usually involve complex mod-
elling and theoretical inferences (Morrison, 2009, 2015; Tal, 2012, 2016; Parker, 2017).
In a recent paper, Staley (2020) has argued that such results gain their credibility in part from
being associated with a measure of systematic uncertainty, which can be fruitfully viewed as
the result of a RA, reflecting the impact of choices in the modelling-assumptions facilitating
the inference to the desired result.4 This is consistent with Karaca’s (2018, p. 7) verdict that
robustness “comes in degrees in the sense that its extent indicates the extent of convergence
of [...] results obtained through different means of detection.” Hence, a result’s systematic
uncertainty may be taken to indicate this degree of convergence, when the different means are
different models facilitating the experimental inference.
Staley presupposes what he calls the ‘secure evidence framework’ (Staley, 2014, 2020), ac-
cording to which an epistemic agent needs to evaluate claim, C, that data x count as evidence for
hypothesis H in relation to her epistemic situation K and an induced set of epistemically possi-
ble scenarios Ω. Defining the result’s systematic and statistical uncertainty is key to weakening
C, which, equivalently, means rendering it independent from potentially erroneous assumptions
in Ω. For the narrower context of generating a quantitative experimental result (QER), this
means that, if a range of different models of an experiment which yields data x all give rise to
results within an interval [λ − δ, λ + δ], then stating the result as quantity Q taking on value
Q = λ ± δ is secure from being dependent on any errors contained in these models.
Without following suit with all the details of Staley’s framework, I will here embrace the
notion that the models used to infer a QER reflect what is initially considered epistemically
possible, and that RA can serve the purpose of determining the QER’s systematic uncertainty.
However, if [λ − δ, λ + δ] exhausts a significant part of the real line, then it is hardly sensible to
speak of the “convergence of results obtained through different means of detection”. According
2Cf., however, Stegenga and Menon (2017) for an alternative in terms of conditional probabilistic independence.
3This will become clearer in Sect. 4.1.
4In contrast, statistical uncertainty is “a characteristic of the distribution of outputs of a single model of a measure-
ment process” (Staley, 2020, p. 92; emph. added).
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to Staley (Staley, 2014, pp. 48 ff.; Staley, 2020, p. 103), the strengthening of the premises of an
experimental inference, by carefully ruling out models whose inclusion would lead to a wider
spread ±δ, is key for safeguarding against this. I believe that, in actuality, a combination of RAs
can also do the trick. I will take up this issue, which has a close connection to the notion of
measurement-accuracy, in Sect. 4.3.
3 Conceptual robustness
3.1 The modelling challenge
RA with respect to models and their trustworthiness has traditionally been employed in the con-
text of complex sciences without an encompassing fundamental theory, where different models
necessarily rely on strongly simplifying and idealising assumptions. Examples include ecology
(Weisberg, 2006; Weisberg and Reisman, 2008), climate science (Lloyd, 2009, 2010; Parker,
2011; Winsberg, 2018a,b), or economy (Lehtinen and Kuorikoski, 2007; Kuorikoski et al.,
2010). However, with the electroweak theory and quantum chromodynamics (QCD), jointly
called the ‘Standard Model’ (SM), HEP features a rather solid theoretical basis. So whence the
need for RA?
In fact, the vastness of decays, the nature of the strong coupling (which allows theoretical
computations only for very high energies), and the complexity of the instrumentation required
to tackle all these decays together necessitate various models that are ‘phenomenological’ in
the sense of not being strongly bound to theory in their construction (Suárez and Cartwright,
2008; Karaca, 2013). CSs in HEP comprise two general kinds of simulation based on these
models: Monte Carlo event generators (short: ‘generators’), simulating the physics inside the
beam pipe, i.e., the metallic tube in which particles collide; and detector simulations, simu-
lating the interaction of sufficiently stable decay-products with detector-components (ATLAS
Collaboration, 2010).
Generators are further divided into several stages, called hard scatter, underlying event, parton
shower, and hadronisation. These are heuristically assumed to separate, but feature manifold
connections that ultimately impose the need for mutual recalibration (Boge and Zeitnitz, 2020).
The hard scatter is the elementary scattering process with the highest momentum transfer in the
scattering, an interaction between two constituent partons (quarks or gluons) of the scattering
protons. This is usually the process of interest, because here one may expect the production
of sought-for particles. The underlying event means additional, less energetic scatterings, or
even particles remaining from previous or differently located scatters. The parton shower is
the emission of additional gluons by the accelerating and decelerating coloured particles before
and after the primary interaction. This may be understood in analogy to the ‘Bremsstrahlung’
of accelerating and decelerating electrical charges, but with the radiated particles (gluons) being
coloured and emitting further radiation. Finally, at lower energies, the confining effects of QCD
become important, and partons begin to hadronise, i.e., combine into complex particles, most
of which subsequently decay into more stable ones.
All this goes on before any interaction with the detector. The LHC-detectors are giant ap-
paratuses comprising various technologies. Accordingly, detector simulation takes inputs also
from data, atomic, nuclear, and solid state physics (see GEANT Collaboration, 2016).
Basically all models in this context require extra-theoretic considerations. The hard pro-
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cess builds on perturbative QCD-calculations to some fixed order in a series-development of
elementary cross sections. However, proton-proton cross sections are thereby assumed to ‘fac-
torise’ into weighted sums of parton-level cross sections; an assumption is actually only proven
for a small range of cases (Schwartz, 2014, p. 685; Collins, 2011, pp. 1–2). The resulting
probability-weights (called ‘parton density functions’), furthermore, can only be obtained by
fitting parametric functions to a broad range of data (also Staley, 2020; Ritson and Staley,
2020). Similarly, shower models utilize an approximate QCD-result as the basis of a Markov-
chain in which partons are radiated at distinct times (cf. Höche, 2016, p. 242). But the resulting
probability-functions diverge in the limit where the approximation becomes exact, and CSs
include a pragmatic cut-off, corresponding to the resolution of the detector.
Theoretical results are especially sparse for hadronisation,5 since perturbative QCD breaks
down at lower energies. Furthermore, these models “inextricably couple” (Dissertori et al.,
2003, p. 172) to other models in the chain, which forestalls validating them independently.
Hence the need for RA. However, for an RA to even possibly succeed, different models of the
same process need build on different idealising and simplifying assumptions, so that RA can
exclude a common result to be an artefact of any particular set of such assumptions. Focussing
on hadronisation as the weakest link in the simulation-chain, and ‘string’ and ‘cluster’ models
as the currently most common ones, I shall briefly expand on this.
The main differences here reside in the treatment of the color field. String models focus
on a particular limiting behaviour of this field and largely ignore its quantum nature. They
model it as a flexible string, binding pair-produced quarks, with dynamics determined by a
parametric ‘fragmentation function’ that specifies under which conditions the string tears. This
event indicates the creation of two (unstable) mesons, corresponding to the string fragments.
In contrast, cluster models focus on certain quantum aspects, namely the prediction of color-
entanglement between neighbouring quarks, also called ‘preconfinement’ into ‘clusters’, from a
QCD-approximation which formally takes the number of colour charges to infinity. The result-
ing clusters can be shown to follow a universal (not decay-specific) mass-distribution, which
the simulation samples. Thus, cluster models completely neglect the field-dynamics.
Similarly, whereas cluster models split gluons from the shower stage non-perturbatively into
quark-anti quark pairs, and so essentially ignore them, string models at least preserve them as an
aspect of the semi-classical, string-like field: as ‘kinks’ (or transverse excitations) in the string,
which leads to the generic prediction of a more frequent occurrence of hadrons between quark
and gluon.
3.2 Never trust a (single) generator!
Given these preliminaries, the case for CR is straightforward, and has in part been covered by
Staley (2020, p. 110). Physicists have various generators at their disposal, and comparing the
results gathered from using different generators is basically mandatory:
Monte Carlo event generators are complicated programs that will almost inevitably
contain bugs, incorrect assumptions and ill-chosen parameters. It is therefore vital
that a user does not take any results at face value. As a minimum at least two
5This is similarly true of underlying event or detector models; but the modelling-freedom in the former is con-
strained by the similarity to the hard scatter, and the latter can in part be validated directly (Boge and Zeitnitz,
2020, pp. 28–9).
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completely independent programs should be used in any physics study. (Dissertori
et al., 2003, p. 204; emph. omitted)
A number of things are worth emphasising though. First, the mention of “completely inde-
pendent programs” is well in line with Levins’ famous slogan that the “truth” established by
RA is “the intersection of independent lies” (Levins, 1966, 423). However, there are various
connections between different hadronisation models and programs, and so talk of complete in-
dependence is far-fetched. As explained in Sect. 2, this need not pose a problem, so long as
RA across different models can rule out the explanation of a certain result as an artefact of the
idealising and simplifying properties of these models.
Second, establishing this sort of CR is piecemeal work, and an RA across models needs to
be performed for every data-model-combination. A recent study on the top quark-mass, for
example, employed a newer set of (‘special-purpose’) generators, capable of computing next-
to-leading order matrix elements. But the results varied grossly when these were interfaced
with two different ‘general-purpose’ generators—“to the point of drastically altering the con-
clusions” (Ravasio et al., 2018, p. 3). Hence, depending on the data-model-combination, CR
may fail.
Third, the differences in simulation results, due especially to the limited understanding of
the hadronisation phase, are generally used to define a “hadronization uncertainty” (Dissertori
et al., 2003, p. 244; emph. omitted), in perfect agreement with Staley’s assessment. Similarly,
“in order to assess a meaningful theoretical error [...], the use of different shower models[...] is
mandatory.” (Ravasio et al., 2018, p. 4; emph. added)
However, this is considered a “pragmatic approach to assessing the uncertainties associated
with hadronization” (Dissertori et al., 2003, 172; emphasis added), or simulation more gen-
erally. There is, in other words, no solid a priori reason for determining uncertainty in this
or any other way. In addition, one frequently finds that the prescription uttered by Dissertori
et al. is obeyed only in a minimal sense, i.e., that only two sets of generators are used for
robustness-checks. Besides such concerns as computational expensiveness, this reliance on a
minimal number of different models may be rooted in the vastness of the differences between
them.6
Concluding that a common result is unlikely to arise coincidentally from two very different
models is well in line with the general thinking underpinning RA (e.g. Kuorikoski et al., 2010,
p. 544); albeit with the unlikely coincidental nature of the result rooted in the vastness of dif-
ferences rather than the number of models. Still, it is not clear just how safe an experimental
conclusion relying on a limited number of models like this really is.
4 Methodological robustness
4.1 Convergence of results
Given the aforementioned restrictions in relying on CR alone, it is understandable that this is not
the only sort of RA physicists in HEP perform. To see this, consider the different measurements
of the top quark mass, mt, displayed in Fig. 1. Neither do the central values of mt coincide, nor
6For example, Herwig not only uses cluster- rather than string-hadronisation, but also an angular ordering in the
parton shower rather than the momentum ordering of Pythia (Bähr et al., 2008; Sjöstrand et al., 2008). This
means slicing the radiation process in different ways, and is but one of many theoretically allowed choices.
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do all margins of total uncertainty overlap. But most of them do, and they all overlap with the
uncertainty of the combined world average. In the sense of an overlap to within uncertainty, all
these different measurements are hence consistent with the central claim that mt = 173.34±0.76
GeV.
To infer these different values, ATLAS and CMS used several decay channels, as specified
by comments like ‘ℓ(epton) + jets’ or ‘single top’. This means that, next to the fact that several
generators are used in each individual measurement, there are also different processes simulated
each time. Furthermore, the standard tool for simulating detector effects, the Geant simulation
tool-kit, comprises a vast range of detailed physics models (see GEANT Collaboration, 2016),
and interactions vary with decay chains—as do materials and geometry between ATLAS and
CMS (cf. Seiden, 2012). Finally, the combined world average also contains results from the D0
and CDF collaborations at Fermilab, which used protons and anti-protons, scattered at much
lower energies, with final-state products measured by yet other detectors (see ATLAS, CDF,
CMS and D0 Collaborations, 2014).
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Figure 1: Summary of measurements of mt by the LHC top working group (© CERN
2019). Colour figure online
Additionally, another sort of variation is performed across several measurements: Two stan-
dard analyses are the template and matrix element method, and the roles played by simulated
data differ crucially across these and further analyses. In the first, a range of input values for mt
are used to generate simulated histograms. These are then used as ‘templates’ for what actual
data should look like, given a value of mt, and one infers the best value by means of likelihood
maximisation (see ATLAS Collaboration, 2012). Hence, simulated data are used in a direct,
positive fashion in the template method.
In the matrix element method, one instead calculates from the theory as far as possible, using
different values of mt, and predicts the states to be measured after interaction with the detector
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from a parametric ‘response function’. This function also subsumes shower and hadronisation
effects, thus bypassing a direct involvement of relevant models (Fiedler et al., 2010, p. 204–5).
The parameters of that function are, however, usually fixed using simulated data (D0 Collab-
oration, 2006), and so CSs still enter indirectly. They also enter negatively in defining the
distribution of events to be expected on the ‘background only’-hypothesis (Fiedler et al., 2010,
p. 212).
4.2 Discrimination
Given all these differences, the consistency between the different results is certainly remark-
able. However, by itself, this does not yet rule out that the convergence is due to dependencies
between the different usages of CSs. It seems clear that neither usage of CSs is fully indepen-
dent of the other; for instance, they do not seem to satisfy ‘ontic independence’ (Stegenga and
Menon, 2017, p. 414), i.e, that “the multiple lines of evidence depend on different materials,
assumptions, or theories”. But are they ‘independent enough’ to ensure that MR is not a kind
of ‘pseudo-robustness’ (Staley, 2004b, p. 473; Karaca, 2018, p. 4)?
In order to safeguard against this possibility, different measurements, making use of CSs in
different ways, should not be “correlated with each other to the extent that they yield convergent
results when they should not” (Karaca, 2018, p. 2). Both Staley (2004b) and Karaca (2018)
consider the case of different b-tagging algorithms, which were compared as to their ‘mistags’
in the top-quark discovery. Since these differed among different algorithms, the algorithms
were not simply ‘correlated all across the board’. However, in establishing MR, CSs are used
to simulate different things, whence this sort of “discriminant validation” (Campbell and Fiske,
1959, p. 81) is not feasible.
Another, encompassing sense of discrimination is captured by Schupbach (2016, p. 293 ff.),
who considers several detections R1,R2, . . . ,Rn−1, so far compatible with hypotheses H and H′,
where H′ signifies the hoped-for explanation of the apparently robust result, and H is any rival
explanation. H and H′ could in principle logically coexist, but accepting H′ implies that H
becomes a bad explanation for the past detections. Discrimination now means that, relative to
the remaining n − 1 detections, detection Rn can really only be explained by H′, not H. This
is an iterative process: each of the n detections may rule out a different hypothesis H, so as to
only leave H′ as a plausible explanation.
For robustness to be more than just apparent, different detections themselves hence need to
discriminate against different hypotheses H, i.e., against explanations of the convergent result
in terms of artefacts introduced by either detection. So to rule out, e.g., that the result is purely
due to b-tagging algorithms’ spurious general agreement, one could instead also check these
measurements’ consistency with measurements without b-tagging.
In the case of the different usages of CSs, the different hypotheses H ruled out are that the
measurement result is influenced by the given CS to the extent of becoming an artefact. In
contrast, the hypothesis H′ to be inferred in case of success is the central result that is con-
sistent with all the individual measurements (here: mt = 173.34 ± 0.76 GeV). H and H′ are
logically compatible: The actual value might simply happen to lie in the inferred interval even
if individual measurements predict this on the basis of simulation-related artefacts.
That the different detections of mt are indeed relevantly discriminating can be seen as fol-
lows: Simulating only the background, as in the matrix element method, means eliminating the
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possibility that the value mt = 173.34 ± 0.76 GeV is inferred purely due to a misidentification
of the signal-shape on the basis of modelling errors (as might happen in the template method).
Similarly, inferring values consistent with H′ both from templates which contain a single lepton
and templates which contain only hadronic jets means ruling out that the result is inferred purely
due to a misidentification of the properties of the lepton. The ℓ+jets and all jets-channels also
do not depend equally strongly on the choice of hadronisation model, and the corresponding
uncertainties derived by CMS differ by 350 MeV (ATLAS, CDF, CMS and D0 Collaborations,
2014, p. 20). (And so forth.) Hence, the aforementioned differences render pseudo-robustness
at least very improbable.
4.3 Security versus informativeness
Recall now how a quantitative RA can only succeed if results from different detections lie in
sufficient proximity. In close connection to this observation, Parker (2017, p. 279; emph. added)
points out that “a well-motivated uncertainty estimate [...][also] indicates the degree to which
the measuring process is expected to be informative”, where by “informativeness”, she roughly
means the extent to which a result narrows down the epistemic background possibilities an agent
can coherently entertain. Similarly, Staley (2020, pp. 105–6) concerns himself with a measure-
ment’s sensitivity to the phenomena of interest, construed as “the ability of a measurement
result to inform our answers to substantive physics questions.”7
Thus, there appear to be two distinct pay-offs to a quantitative RA: (A) Securing the result
from being severely wrong by quantifying the impact of possible errors in its generation; and
(B) establishing its informativeness by exhibiting the extent to which individual detections con-
verge. However, (A) and (B) pull in opposite directions: A broader uncertainty margin is ‘safer’,
as it admits to more potential errors; but it arguably renders the result less informative.
Another way of phrasing things is in terms of accuracy. Following Tal (2012, pp. 30–2),
there are several different readings of ‘measurement-accuracy’, and construed epistemically,
‘accuracy’ means that the design and use of an instrument or procedure “warrant the attribution
of a narrow range of [...] values to objects” under study (ibid, p. 31). This is not to be conflated
with precision, which is just one aspect of epistemic accuracy, with imprecision being “caused
by uncontrolled variations to the equipment, operation or environment when measurements are
repeated” (ibid, p. 32). In contrast, uncertainty, construed as an antonym to epistemic accu-
racy, can obviously also have systematic sources (ibid.). Furthermore, ‘accuracy’ can also be
meant in a comparative sense, i.e., as a result’s reproducibility “under controlled variations to
measurement conditions and methods.” (ibid.)
However, epistemic accuracy thus also delivers a (though not ‘the’) measure of a QER’s
informativeness: A QER with small uncertainty is not only epistemically accurate, but also
informative about the phenomena of interest, since it rules out a broader spectrum of models or
theories. If a QER yields Q̂ ∈ ∆, but theory T predicts that quantity Q actually has a value in
Γ, where Γ ∩ ∆ = ∅, T may stand refuted unless one finds reasons to broaden the uncertainty
margin (e.g. by reassessing the auxiliary hypotheses needed to derive Q ∈ Γ from T ).
As mentioned before, Staley (2020, Sect. 7) addresses these issues in terms of ‘strengthening
strategies’ that (mostly) consist in ruling out possibly erroneous premises empirically, thereby
7Following Beauchemin (2017), he means by ‘sensitivity’ that the result’s uncertainty is small enough to dis-
criminate between different theoretical predictions (see Staley, 2020, p. 106). It is easily seen that this closely
corresponds to the notion of informativeness I invoke below.
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decreasing the uncertainty margin. However, this too is not generally feasible for HEP sim-
ulation models, due to their ‘inextricable coupling’. Luckily, physicists have another ace up
their sleeves. To see this, consider mt’s combined world average again, which was computed
by the ATLAS, CDF, CMS and D0 Collaborations (2014) using an algorithm that approximates
the best linear unbiased estimate (‘BLUE’); that linear combination of the different measured
values which minimises overall uncertainty. Hence, the resulting uncertainty-measure specifies
the minimum uncertainty that has to be assumed when all measurements are taken into account.
This uncertainty is larger than that of the overall ATLAS and CMS values, but smaller than
that of their combined value. It is also smaller than that of more than 80% of the results from
individual decay-chains. Hence, by replacing the epistemic accuracies associated with the indi-
vidual results by a comparative measure of accuracy that establishes their consistency to within
a rather narrow span, the combined result is not only more secure but also more informative
than most individual results.8 In other words: by directly determining the extent of convergence
between individual results, physicists achieve a balance between security and informativeness
from a skilful combination of RAs, without the need to appeal to external strengthening strate-
gies.
5 Robustness and parameters
5.1 Universal or not?
CSs in HEP depend on a whole number of free parameters, and such an occurrence of parame-
ters is ubiquitous in simulation-intensive sciences, but “has received surprisingly little attention
from philosophers.” (Hasse and Lenhard, 2017, p. 95) Free parameters bear the danger of spoil-
ing predictivity: The success that string models can claim by predicting a specific distribution of
hadrons from kinks in the string is arguably undermined by the fact that these predictions only
obtain a quantitatively precise form once the model’s parameters have been fitted to data. Given
that successful predictions are the hallmark of confirmation, this means trouble for parametrised
models.
Of course, parameters are actually ubiquitous in science overall: With neutrino masses, the
SM itself has 27 free parameters, but this has not hindered its being hailed the most successful
scientific theory to date. Three factors have arguably facilitated this immunity to the parameters’
success-undermining power: (a) They are physically meaningful quantities (such as masses and
couplings); (b) there are certain dependencies between them that constrain some of them, once
some others have been fixed (they exhibit an exploitable coherence); and, most importantly, (c)
“the Standard Model is an overconstrained system – we can test it by making enough measure-
ments with enough precision.” (Schwartz, 2014, p. 641)
When literally thought of as parameters of a model, (c) expresses the property I have called
inverse parametric robustness (IPR) in Sect. 1: There is a set of values that can be consistently
inferred from a range of rather different experimental settings. However, on account of (a), these
‘parameters’ of the SM are simply experimentally robust quantities in the traditional sense (e.g.
8I admit that the increase in informativeness is accompanied by a decrease in security at the level of meta-analysis:
In using the BLUE-method, certain non-trivial assumptions have to be made, such as results being Gaußian-
distributed. However, the general epistemic intuition, that the best value must lie somewhere in between and
should be associated with the minimum uncertainty necessitated by all results, would certainly be served by
many other methods.
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Staley, 2004b; Schupbach, 2016; Karaca, 2018).
Now, are (a)–(c) also true of the parameters that occur in HEP simulation models? Let us
address this step by step. First of all, one of the two fundamental string parameters was initially
used to model a ‘string tension’, or rather, the uniform energy-density of the narrow flux-tube
into which the colour-field is supposed to collapse on account of the model. This idea gained
momentum from an analogy to an approximate result from quantum electrodynamics, but the
approximation is known to be poor, and predictions based on the physically suggested value for
the parameter are often off by large percentages (see, e.g. Dissertori et al., 2003, p. 166).
This type of process is characteristic of HEP simulation parameters. So by and large, the
situation appears to be as in thermodynamics, where certain “models have parameters which
describe physical quantities in the simple context for which they were initially developed. [...]
But in the complex context in which they are used as fitting parameters, the original physical
meaning is lost[...].” (Hasse and Lenhard, 2017, p. 109)
So much for (a). What about (b), the parameters’ exploitable coherence? As emphasized
already in Sect. 3.1, HEP simulation parameters are “closely entangled” (Corcella et al., 2018,
p. 489), so it is in general not feasible to fix some of them first and then use these to constrain
others. Hence, neither (a) nor (b) seem to hold for HEP simulation parameters.
It could be argued, though, that this is not so bad, so long as parameters can at least be fixed
once and for all: (b) seems mostly like a convenience, and the failure of (a) mostly says that
these parameters do not have a fundamental meaning. But they might still offer a phenomeno-
logical (i.e.: coarse, non-fundamental) representation of the physics inside particle colliders.
In this connection, it is important to note the generic split between event generators and de-
tector simulations. While it is in principle conceivable that the detector exerts a non-negligible
influence, the modelling proceeds as if the physics inside the beam pipe fully decouples from
what goes on inside the detector. Hence, to establish a phenomenological pendant of (a), it
would at least be necessary to establish a uniquely best set of parameters across the different
experiments at the LHC, where scattered particles and energies are identical.
In fact, there are even stronger allusions to the universality of certain parameter-values in the
physics literature:
one finds in practice that [...] a single set of parameters describes the data at a wide
range of energies and processes. [...] Thus, hadronization models tuned to e+e−
annihilation, and lower energy hadron collider data, are highly predictive for LHC
events. (Seymour and Marx, 2015, pp. 309–10)
The “in practice” and the “wide range of energies and processes” here indicate that, insofar
as universality can be established, it is partially grounded in RA. More precisely, parameters
are initially ‘tuned’ or calibrated to certain reference-data that can be understood without the
simulation. This can be done in a variety of ways, for instance by manually adjusting them
in direct comparison with data, or by randomly sampling from a large number of choices until
an optimum value is reached, as determined by a goodness-of-fit metric. More systematic ap-
proaches, such as the Professor-toolkit (Buckley et al., 2010), optimize polynomial expansions
of the Monte Carlo predictions in several orders of their parameters across large numbers of
bin-values for various observables.
Because of the appeal to reference-data, ‘tuning’ means establishing a given choice of values
experimentally, but in a way that might still depend on the peculiarities of the chosen data. The
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established parameter-set is hence usually validated on further data. This is done, for instance,
using the Rivet-toolkit (Bierlich et al., 2020), “a library of experimental analyses and of tools
for calculating physical observables from an event record” (Buckley et al., 2010, p. 332). Since
each validation means testing whether the parameter-set describes the relevant data reasonably
well, a set of values that achieves a good fit across these varying experimental conditions can
be called ‘robust’ in the sense of IPR.
Now I said that claims to universality are partially grounded in an experimental RA, and the
reason is that it is also theory-supported:
One can show that this is a consequence of preconfinement: the perturbative pro-
duction and evolution of partons takes care of the process and energy-dependence
and the transition from partons to hadrons is a local process, independent of these
factors. (Seymour and Marx, 2015, p. 310)
However, recall that preconfinement is only an approximate result, derived by taking the
number of colour-charges to infinity. There are, in fact, also theoretical reasons for doubting
IPR:
it is not absolutely guaranteed that models which reproduce e+e− data work equally
well in a colored environment like tt̄ events at the LHC, where initial-state radia-
tion, color reconnection and underlying event play a role. (Corcella, 2019, p. 71)
This is not an academic point: The ‘Monash tuning’ for Pythia (Skands et al., 2014), for
instance, which mostly exploited LHC-data rather than data from electron-positron-scattering,
led to significant changes in certain string parameters (with some parameters being more than
doubled; cf. Skands et al., 2014, Tab. 4), and simultaneously to improvements in correspon-
dence with several data. Skands et al. (2014, p. 1) also mention some “interesting discrepan-
cies” though, as well as several generic reasons for further improving the Pythia-code, which
“should in principle be accompanied by a reevaluation of the model constraints.” (Skands et al.,
2014, p. 27) Accordingly, the tune is “[b]y no means [...] the final word”, and the study gives a
bold outlook on the difficulties associated with IPR:
If[...] some data sets result in significantly different tune parameters, one has a
powerful indication that the universality of the underlying modeling is breaking
down [...]. (Skands et al., 2014, p. 31)
Still, differences between the Monash tune and the former default are accompanied by impor-
tant physical differences: In the default tune, the scatterers were leptonic (and so not coloured),
whence, for instance, no initial-state gluon radiation is to be expected. Hence, the above verdict
could still be upheld at this point: So long as there was a uniquely best tune across different
LHC experiments, where the phenomenology is the same, these parameters could have physical
meaning.
This is far from true though: each LHC-collaboration, like ATLAS or CMS, has a whole
range of different tunes for the same generator, depending on the details of use. An impressive
– though far from exhaustive – overview can be gathered from websites and documentation files
for different generators.9
9E.g. http://home.thep.lu.se/∼torbjorn/pythia82html/Tunes.html (checked 01/21).
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To get an impression of the purpose-dependency, it is instructive to consider the four different
tunes devised by the Atlas Collaboration (2014) to match underlying event-data. When com-
bined with one out of four parton density functions specified in the study, each of these achieved
a good fit to reference data; but they vary amongst each other by up to some 24% of the lowest
value of some parameters, and there is also a mention of “[a]dditional tunes [...] in preparation
for use with higher-order matrix elements.” (ibid., p. 1)
Given the relatively big differences in these values, even for one specific purpose, the pos-
sibility of associating a definite phenomenological meaning to these parameters seems pretty
much spoiled. There is, in other words, no solid ground for claiming IPR to hold across the
LHC.
5.2 Tuning for accuracy
The apparent failure of IPR clearly impacts the models’ representational capacity: If their
parameters were to describe physical properties of processes like hadronisation or the parton
shower, their values should not be sensitive to the detector used, or to the specific type of event
simulated. Even more so, there should not be several different, but equally suitable, values for
the exact same simulated event. However, does this failure of IPR also spoil the possibility of
trusting these models in their QER-facilitating capacity?
To address this question, observe, e.g., that the greatest differences effected in measurable
quantities by the Monash tuning were in the order of 10% (Skands et al., 2014, p. 29). This
is certainly not nothing, but also a big stretch from doubling, or even 24%. Furthermore, large
uncertainties in parameters certainly can influence experimental results: In the 1990s, Tevatron-
data were interpreted as indicating evidence for a new level of sub-quark particles—which ev-
idence vanished when parton density functions were recalibrated on additional data (Dorigo,
2016, Chapt. 9). However, uncertainty propagation often results in only small contributions
to quantities of interest, which safeguards against such an effect. Hence, even if IPR fails,
isn’t PR, the insensitivity of results to changes in parameter-values, enough to render at least
simulation-infected experimental results trustworthy?
I believe this is ultimately correct, but given the failure of IPR, PR itself enjoys a subtle status
in HEP. To see this in detail, consider a recent study (Corcella et al., 2018) of the sensitivity of
mt-measurements to simulation-parameters. Since mt is pivotal for constraining the Higgs-mass
or determining the life-time of the SM-vacuum, it is “of paramount importance to measure mt
with the highest possible accuracy” (ibid., p 486).
A central problem in mt’s determination resides in fundamental uncertainties in the energy-
scale of b-jets; characteristically broad jets of hadronic particles resulting from decays of heavy
b-quarks, intermediate in top-decays. An alternative is to exploit decays in which the b-quark
forms a B-meson, a b-flavoured hadron which then decays into other characteristic particles. In
this case, jet uncertainties do not enter in the same ways, but:
a crucial role is nevertheless played by the hadronization of b quarks into B-hadrons
and the associated Monte Carlo uncertainty. (Corcella et al., 2018, p. 487)
In order to determine the impact of changes in the hadronisation parameters, Corcella et al.
(2018) performed a sensitivity-analysis for relevant measurements. Surprisingly, mt was most
sensitive to the strong coupling for final state radiation in Pythia’s (partly theory-driven) parton
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shower, not to any of the (essentially free) hadronisation parameters (see Table 7 in Corcella
et al., 2018). Moreover, when inferred from certain dedicated observables, the sensitivity of mt
to simulation parameters turned out to be comparatively low overall.
Prima facie, the study delivers a solid reason to think that experimental results can be robust
against changes in the simulation-parameters when the observables used to infer them are care-
fully chosen. However, there are several curious features contained in the reasoning expressed
therein. First off, Corcella et al. (2018, p. 492) avoided “values too far from the default” and var-
ied parameters “up and down by at most 20% of their central values.” By itself, the restriction
to a certain range of variation is nothing worrisome, and neither is, necessarily, the restriction to
20%: standards of variation in estimating uncertainty are generally fixed by convention in HEP.
What is peculiar is the reason given by Corcella et al. (2018, ibid.; emph. added) for re-
stricting attention to 20 rather than, say, 50%; namely, that “values too far from the default [...]
might generate unforeseen changes in the Monte Carlo predictions”. The philosopher well ed-
ucated in the pitfalls of reasoning should be struck by this comment. For wasn’t the very reason
for performing a sensitivity analysis to determine whether changes in the parameters do lead
to unforeseen changes in predictions? Taken literally, this quote hence expresses a petitio: If
the possibility of “unforeseen changes” was used to justify confining one’s attention to ranges
where these are not expected, the expectation of a small impact of parameter variations would
follow trivially. This cannot be right.
Now IPR could establish a rational reason for confining attention to the particular region.
I.e., if, given all empirical evidence, it was safe to assume that the parameters must lie in close
proximity to one particular tune, varying them by only a small percentage would be justified.
However, we already know that this is not true. The actual reasons for the 20%-restriction were
rooted rather in the fact that the analysis was (largely) based on the Monash tune, which, to
recall, was itself based on LHC data. Hence, specificity to the experimental context grounded the
restriction to a preferred region of values, not robustness across various experimental contexts.
This sort of specificity is driven on the edge by the eventual method for increasing accuracy
suggested by Corcella et al. (2018): An in situ calibration of simulation-parameters, by defining
a number of ‘calibration observables’ relevant to the general measurement of mt, but rather
insensitive to mt itself, and tuning the simulation directly to mt-data. Notably, circularity is
evaded if calibration observables are chosen such that they do not (strongly) depend on mt.10
But: “it will be very unlikely for such fits to be ‘universal’, i.e., they are not expected to be
reliable outside the very same data sample accounted for in the parameter adjustment.” (Corcella
et al., 2018, p. 520; emphasis original)
The point to be gathered is this: A high amount of PR can only be established by first cali-
brating parameters in a highly specific way – maybe even to one particular decay-chain. This
does not speak against PR’s relevance for establishing trust in the CSs’ result-facilitating ca-
pacity per se. But it forcefully underscores that it seems rather impossible to associate their
parameters with a definite physical meaning, and raises the question of how else to understand
these.
There is another sense in which PR can be established: In the global analysis discussed in
Sect. 4.1, different studies also used different tunes. Hence, next to MR, this analysis also brings
home some amount of PR, by establishing a consistent result from several tunes. By itself,
10See Staley (2004a, pp. 245–7), Beauchemin (2017), and Ritson and Staley (2020) for more encompassing analyses
of potential circularities in HEP.
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however, this ability to infer consistent results from different parameter-tunings is insufficient
for securing results from error as well. An impressive example from astrophysics is discussed
by Gueguen (2019), where several CSs converge on a prediction for the disruption of dark
matter subhaloes for a certain choice of parameters—“[b]ut if another region of the parameter
space is scrutinized, convergence is found on another prediction, that contradicts the former.”
(ibid., p. 9) Hence, at least one of these convergences must be spurious, produced as an artefact
of the tuning.
I believe that physicists in HEP are in a better position, for two reasons. First, in the genera-
tion of QERs in HEP, such as that of the world average for mt, several distinct tunings are used
to generate consistent results; not just one tuning per CS, as in the astrophysics case. Second,
given that HEP is experimental rather than observational, in the sense that researchers enjoy a
high degree of control over their objects of study, these tunings can be validated against ref-
erence data. Obviously, this is only possible if the given tuning is not entirely specific to the
experimental context in which it is ultimately used, i.e., not generated in situ. Nevertheless the
consistency between results inferred by appeal to highly specific tunes and well-validated, less
specific ones gives HEP physicists an edge in claims to PR.
6 Trust and its limits
6.1 Commonality, confirmation, and two senses of trust
Overall, CR, MR, and PR together secure a rather solid basis for investing belief in experimental
results, in the sense that they are probably not artefacts, and that future developments in theory,
experiment, and modelling will not lead to radical changes in their central values. However,
what, if anything, can and do these RAs establish about the models themselves?
Recall that a key role in RAs across models is played not only by the differences in idealisa-
tion and simplification, but also by what is common to all models (Weisberg, 2006; Schupbach,
2016). The commonalities between string and cluster models, e.g., mostly reside in qualitative
features of QCD, such as pair-creation out of the vacuum, (pre-)confinement to intermediate,
short-lived hadrons (‘strings’, ‘clusters’, etc.), and energy-momentum-conservation in the non-
perturbative regime. Given that there are many shared predictions between these models, those
features could give rise to robust theorems (Levins, 1966; Weisberg, 2006; Weisberg and Reis-
man, 2008). A now-classic example is the ‘Volterra property’ (Weisberg, 2006; Weisberg and
Reisman, 2008): that a general biocide increases the abundance of prey and decreases the abun-
dance of predators. The common structure of ecological models predicting this is a negative
coupling between prey and predators, i.e., that more prey leads to more predators but more
predators lead to less prey (ibid., p. 114). Hence, it is a robust theorem that (ceteris paribus) a
predator-prey system with this sort of coupling will exhibit the Volterra property.
The existence of robust theorems paves the way to what Weisberg (2006, p. 740; emph.
omitted) calls “low-level confirmation”; that “certain mathematical structures can adequately
represent properties of target phenomena.” This is to be distinguished from the much stronger
sense of confirmation gained by inferring a result consistently from various models and em-
pirical data in concert. However, robust theorems are of the conditional form ‘If structure S is
present, then, ceteris paribus, property P will be instantiated’, so low-level confirmation could
be conceived of semi-empirically, as an induction over antecedent hypotheses: All models con-
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sistent with evidence so far (i.e., that exhibited P) had certain antecedent-properties (S ); hence,
probably any model will. In turn, this may single out the uniquely best modelling assumptions,
pointing to an underlying reality.
This is a sensible account of confirmation directly from a model-based RA, compatible also
with considerations by Lloyd (2010). A general reason for scepticism is that it is never really
possible to tell how much of the hypothesis-space has been exhausted (Stanford, 2006; van
Fraassen, 1989). However, there are far more specific reasons to be sceptical in this particular
context, covered in Sect. 6.3. For now, note that what could possibly be confirmed here are
very generic features of QCD, already assumed to be correct by the physics community. Hence,
these robust theorems are not particularly interesting.
Non-empirical confirmation has received a new spin from the debate on theories in funda-
mental physics (Dawid, 2013; Dardashti et al., 2019), and some authors in that debate (e.g.
Smeenk, 2019; Cabrera, 2018) distinguish between two senses of trust one can invest in a theo-
retical entity: trust in the sense of belief, and trust in the sense of acceptance, where in contrast
to belief, “acceptance is context-dependent, shaped by factors other than evidence, voluntary,
and exempt from demands for overall consistency across contexts.” (Frost-Arnold, 2014, 1964)
Trusting HEP simulation models in their capacity to facilitate experimental results could
mean accepting them in the voluntary, context-dependent sense indicated by Frost-Arnold (2014).
However, this does not imply a commitment to accepting them as candidate representations of
the goings on in the beam pipe. Hence, it also does not settle the question as to ‘as what’ we
may accept them.
6.2 Instrumental reliability
Observe, now, that part of the reason why PR is possible lies in the availability of various tun-
ings. In other words: The very feature that makes these CSs suspicious as candidate representa-
tions of the goings on in the beam pipe promotes their trustworthiness in their QER-facilitating
capacity. I now turn to a positive account of ‘as what’ we should accept these simulation models
that takes this observation to heart. In this connection, note another important observation by
Hasse and Lenhard (2017, p. 102):
Calibration[...] is used in the context of measuring instruments. Hence, [...] cali-
bration of parameters makes models look a bit like precision instruments.
While Hasse and Lenhard themselves do not endorse this reading, I believe it is right on
track: The delicate status of parameters exhibited above leaves us in no better position than
to regard HEP simulation models as reliable (cognitive) instruments, insofar as they establish
an inferential connection between data and QERs without painting a trustworthy picture of the
underlying reality.11
To see this more clearly, consider Tal’s (2012, pp. 151 ff.) elaborate account of what he calls
‘white box’-calibration. What is ‘white boxed’ here is the overall model of the experiment to
which a given instrument is calibrated.12 This models includes several parameters, representing
11I do not mean this instrumentalism in any overly restrictive sense, i.e., do not commit “the mistake of imagining
that a theory [or model] is simply a tool for moving inferentially from some states of affairs [...] to others”
(Stanford, 2006, p. 207; orig. emph.).
12It is important not to conflate several issues here: Tal (2012) cites Boumans (2006), who applies ‘white box’
to models that are sufficiently transparent to answer why-questions. But a simulation model can, of course,
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the properties of the instrument itself, details about the reference data to calibrate on, the impact
of background effects, etc. For an instrument indication to be informative about the value of
the quantity to be measured, a ‘calibration function’ must be established which delivers the
instrument indications as a function of the quantity’s values, relative to the parameters of the
white box-model. In a final step, a ‘backward function’ is then established, which allows to
infer values from instrument indications relative to these parameters.
A subset of the parameters directly characterize the instrument. For instance, in the speci-
fication of properties of a calliper (cf. Tal, 2012, p. 152), some, like the fineness of the scale
or the length of the leg, can be considered as intrinsic to it. The remaining parameters will
characterize ambient features such as properties of the reference data, experimental conditions,
etc. Some parameters will also represent – often indirectly – a relation between instrument and
ambient conditions, like the temperature of the calliper-scale, which indirectly characterizes the
energy-exchange with the environment (cf. Tal, 2012, p. 153).
Now in the calliper models, as discussed by Tal, all these properties are considered fixed.
However, some instruments’ properties are flexible, and this allows adjusting the instrument
to the given experimental context. For example, an ordinary pressure gauge has mechanical
connections and adjustable links that can be unscrewed and repositioned, and this may be nec-
essary depending on the ambient environmental conditions (Cable, 2005, pp. 52–5). Tweaking
the instrument-properties in this way is formally analogous to fitting the calibration function by
adjusting some of its parameters. But fitting the parameters of a simulation model may thus be
viewed as adjusting an instrument’s properties to ambient conditions of use.
I believe that it is not only possible to view simulation models as instruments in this way, but
even advantageous. First, if simulation models are instruments, it is perfectly understandable
that each LHC-collaboration comes down with its own tunes. This just means adjusting the
instrument to a range of tasks, taking track of the relation between instrument and (known)
ambient conditions. A procedure like this would, in contrast, make no sense if the model was
to represent the goings-on within the measured system.
Second, if simulation models are instruments, then even calibrating in situ is nothing sus-
picious at all: Calibrating an instrument in situ means taking track of the relation between
experimental inputs and measured values in the precise context into which the instrument is
embedded, and this is sometimes recognised as an advantage of in situ calibration on material
instruments (e.g. Cable, 2005, p. 12). It is then also unsurprising that measurements can be
associated with a smaller uncertainty, since the calibration procedure eliminates the possibility
of error due to unrepresentative environmental conditions.
Third, if calibrating on the very data used for measurement means eliminating possible errors
in representing the ambient environmental conditions, this also serves RA’s aim of securing the
result from important sources of error. It hence becomes understandable why Corcella et al.
(2018, 490; emph. added) considered their procedure to not only yield “an improvement of the
accuracy” but also “the robustness of the mass measurement.”
Assuming that these models, thus, function as instruments, in what sense can we regard them
as reliable? The sense of reliability here is that, when calibrated to sufficiently specific experi-
mental conditions, they can facilitate convergent QERs in ways that do not crucially depend on
either model’s properties. This was fully evidenced in Sect. 4, and may be seen as an instance
fail to (accurately) answer ‘why’-questions about its purported target while being sufficiently transparent (qua
instrument) to allow for the sort of calibration investigated by Tal.
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of what Parker (2020, p. 462; emph. omit.) calls “reliability in a type of use”. This reliability,
generating a kind of adequacy-for-purpose, is present for tool M when in instances of type C, a
user U, following a methodology W under circumstances B, is likely to achieve purpose P with
M.
As we saw, in instances of simulation-infected measurements (C), HEP-collaborations (U),
following a calibration procedure (W) that involves relevantly similar data (B), can achieve
measurement results (P) that lie in sufficient proximity to one another so as to define a(n infor-
mative) common result. Furthermore, since each measurement discriminates against different
hypotheses, H, as to the result’s potentially artefactual nature, this usage can be seen to likely
serve the intended purpose. This fully establishes the sense of reliability I have in mind.
6.3 Assumption convergence: A rejoinder?
What could be countered to rehabilitate these models’ representational status? As discussed in
Sect. 6.1, a common core beyond generic QCD-features could lead to ‘richer’ robust theorems,
thus giving rise to a more meaningful kind of “low-level confirmation”. Furthermore, different
hadronisation models are not entirely independent, as mentioned in Sect. 3.2, and hence there is
reason to believe this greater common core might exist. For instance, string and cluster models
both face limitations in certain mass domains, and so lighter strings are essentially treated as
clusters in string models whereas heavier clusters are essentially treated as strings in cluster
models (see Dissertori et al., 2003, p. 171). More generally:
The accumulation of more precise data have led the models to converge to some-
thing more similar. The string model has had successively refined perturbative
evolution and the cluster model has become successively more string-like. This
leads one to wonder whether nature is pointing us towards a model in which the
flavour mix is largely determined by the perturbative dynamics, as in the cluster
model, and their distributions largely determined by non-perturbative string dy-
namics. (Seymour and Marx, 2015, 309)
A possible explanation of the successful use of such converged models could hence be that
they at least partially capture the truth. I mentioned before that there are some general reasons
for scepticism about this sort of confirmation, but in the present context, there are also quite
specific reasons.
First, recall that parametrisation in hadronisation-modelling is applied at a level where many
details remain unresolved. The success of models whose parameters reside at such a level of
grain cannot be clearly attributed to their underlying assumptions:
If the model agrees with the observations against which it is tested, this could be
the result of “compensating errors” (namely, the model has been tuned as a whole),
and if the model does not agree with the observations, one does not know which
adjustable parameters (or even complete parametrisations) are wrong. (Petersen,
2000, p. 269)
Peterson here refers to climate models, and one might argue that the situation is different in
HEP; for it is not the success of current models but rather the failure of older models that leads
to the possibility of semi-empirical confirmation.
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Second, however, the in situ calibration for increased accuracy described above pertains to
quite recent models, and each collaboration keeps producing (and using) individual tunes for
specific purposes. Hence, the physical meaningfulness of converged models remains impaired
by the fact that parameters will be adjusted to details that should not matter for their inter-
pretation. I thus maintain that the actual use of HEP simulation parameters spoils the indicated
possibility of semi-empirical confirmation: Being able to rule out some models across all values
of parameters does not render the remaining models trustworthy beyond instrumental reliability.
7 Conclusions
I have argued that CSs in HEP can be trusted in their capacity to facilitate credible experimental
results when individual results are robust against changes of simulation model and consistent
results are generated using different processes to simulate, analyses making use of CSs in dif-
ferent ways, and even different parameter-tunings. Furthermore, by combining several results
so generated, it is possible to strike a balance between security and informativeness.
However, the models involved in generating these results exhibited a curious failure of robust-
ness regarding their parameters: Choices of tune are not necessarily consistent even across the
LHC, and different tunes can in principle alter CS-based predictions non-negligibly. This deli-
cate combination of robustness and failures thereof was used to argue that, while experimental
results can be trusted in the strong sense of belief, the simulation models used to generate them
can be trusted only in the weak sense of acceptance as reliable instruments. The strongest rea-
sons given for this were that hyper-specific tunes can increase experimental accuracy and that
experimental collaborations each use various tunes while the physics targeted by them should
be insensitive to the detailed experimental conditions.
These reservations against the models’ faithful representational status could be answered
by deeper modelling and parametrisation at a higher grain, but whether this is actually possible
remains a question for working physicist to answer. It would, of course, even then be possible to
remain sceptical about semi-empirical confirmation from RA, but I believe that the remaining
doubts would reside at a deeper level of philosophical debate (Stanford, 2006; van Fraassen,
1989).
Finally, the conclusions reached in this paper should be of interest also for other simulation-
heavy fields: Climate models, like HEP simulation models, are highly entrenched (Lenhard
and Winsberg, 2010), whence independent validation is impossible; and models in astrophysics
exhibit similar peculiarities regarding their free parameters (Gueguen, 2019). Furthermore,
due to its overall organisation and properly experimental status, HEP is subject to favourable
epistemic conditions regarding the justification and use of its CSs (see Boge and Zeitnitz, 2020).
Hence, conclusions drawn for HEP likely transfer to fields where the conditions are arguably
less favourable.
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Thébault, K., editors, Why Trust a Theory? Epistemology of Fundamental Physics, pages
315–335. Cambridge University Press.
Staley, K. (2004a). The Evidence for the Top Quark: Objectivity and Bias in Collaborative
Experimentation. Cambridge University Press.
Staley, K. W. (2004b). Robust evidence and secure evidence claims. Philosophy of Science,
71(4):467–488.
Staley, K. W. (2014). Experimental knowledge in the face of theoretical error. Error and
uncertainty in scientific practice: History and philosophy of technoscience, pages 39–56.
Staley, K. W. (2020). Securing the empirical value of measurement results. The British Journal
for the Philosophy of Science, 71(1):87–113.
Stanford, K. P. (2006). Exceeding Our Grasp. Science, History, and the Problem of Uncon-
23
Why trust a simulation?
ceived Alternatives. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Stegenga, J. and Menon, T. (2017). Robustness and independent evidence. Philosophy of
Science, 84(3):414–435.
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